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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900550-CA 
v. t 
CHRISTOPHER BEVARDf : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted 
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-5-205 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990)f as the appeal is from a district court 
in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Was the trial court correct in instructing the jury 
regarding a lesser included offense of second degree murder, 
which instruction was requested by the State and objected to by 
defendant? The trial court has the duty to instruct the jury on 
the law applicable to the facts of the case. State v. Potter, 
627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). Where the trial court determines 
that a requested jury instruction is applicable to the case, that 
conclusion is a legal one; legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with attempted second degree 
murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-4-101 and 76-5-203 (1990), on March 7, 1990 (Record [hereafter 
R.] at 19). Prior to trial, defendant requested certain jury 
instructions, including instructions that his conduct was 
justified as either self-defense or defense of habitation. These 
instructions were given at trial (R. at 32-33). 
On September 12, 1990, an amended information was filed 
which still charged attempted criminal homicide, but added the 
words "by use of a firearm" to the charging language (R. at 39-
40). The matter was tried by a jury on September 13-14, 1990, in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, district judge, presiding (R. at 
96-100). The State asked for, and received, jury instructions 
for the lesser included offenses of attempted manslaughter and 
aggravated assault (R. at 79-80). The jury convicted defendant 
of attempted manslaughter (R. at 95 and 99). Defendant was 
sentenced on October 12, 1990, for the statutory term; the 
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sentence was suspended and defendant placed on probation (R. at 
101-102). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because defendant's issues on appeal involve the giving 
of a lesser included offense instruction, a recitation of the 
facts underlying the conviction will not be necessary. The facts 
pertinent to this appeal are contained in the statement of the 
case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that manslaughter 
is a statutorily designated lesser included offense of second 
degree murder. Consequently, the court may instruct the jury 
regarding this offense at the request of the prosecution, and 
over the defendant's objection, if defendant's due process right 
to notice and sufficient time to prepare is met. Defendant 
raised the defense of justification before trial and the State 
responded with a manslaughter jury instruction using the legal 
justification subsection of the manslaughter statute. Defendant 
was on notice and had time to prepare to raise his justification 
defense and to address the State's rebuttal that he was not 
legally justified in shooting the victim. 
Since the court correctly instructed the jury regarding 
manslaughter as a lesser included offense, defendant's claim that 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GAVE THE STATE'S 
REQUESTED LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTIONS OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury on attempted manslaughter as a lesser 
included offense of attempted second degree murder. While some 
aspects of jury instructions are within the discretion of#the 
trial court, State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988), 
"[t]he trial court has a duty to» instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case." State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 
75, 78 (Utah 1981). Where, as in this case, the trial court 
determines that a requested jury instruction is applicable to the 
case, that conclusion is a legal one. Legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 
P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
Jury instructions regarding lesser included offenses, 
and the definition of lesser included offenses, are found in the 
criminal code. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990) reads, in 
pertinent part: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged 
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or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. 
Whether, and to what extent, trial courts may charge a jury with 
respect to lesser included offenses has been addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court. In a case similar to the present one*/ a 
defendant argued that there was no such crime as attempted 
manslaughter. In State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), the 
court held that there is a crime of attempted manslaughter under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (c) (1990)1, the subsection which 
was used in the present case. Id., at 94. As in the present 
case, Howell argued that the State "must stand on the formal 
charges alleged in the information and that a defendant may only 
be tried on those crimes formally charged if the defendant wishes 
to hold the State to those charges[.]" Ld. The court rejected 
this argument, holding 
that a trial court may properly give a lesser 
included offense instruction, even over a 
defendant's objection, if there is clearly no 
risk that the defendant will be prejudiced by 
1
 That section and subsection read: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances where the 
actor reasonably believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
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lack of notice and preparation so as to 
deprive him of a full and fair opportunity to 
defend himself. 
Id, at 95• Applying that holding to the facts in that case, the 
court determined that the manslaughter instruction given raised 
the issue of whether the defendant acted with moral or legal 
justification. Such a justification was not a prima facie 
element of the murder originally charged; however, 
the issue of self-defense was fully 
litigated. For all practical purposes, the 
defendant, in relying on self-defense as a 
defense to the murder charges, attempted to 
prove a justification for the homicide. The 
same basic facts were equally at issue in the 
manslaughter charge. The fundamental factual 
defense was the same under all the charges. 
There was, therefore, no surprise or lack of 
preparation necessary to litigate the "moral 
or legal justification" element of 
manslaughter. 
Id. at 95-96. 
Defendant contends that the holding in Howell is 
incorrect in light of State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). 
The court's holding in Baker applies only to situations wherein a 
defendant seeks a jury instruction on lesser included offenses; 
however, in dicta, the court did lay ground rules for situations 
in which the prosecution requests such instructions. 
[W]hen the prosecution seeks instruction on a 
proposed lesser included offense, both the 
legal elements and the actual evidence or 
inferences needed to demonstrate those 
elements must necessarily be included within 
the original charged offense. 
Id. at 156 (emphasis in original) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3)(a)). Two months later, the court explained that Baker 
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"authoritatively construed" subsection (3)(a) of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1983). 
However, the court held that manslaughter is a lesser included 
offense of second degree murder based on subsection (3)(c); 
consequently, they found that the language of Baker was not 
applicable in determining whether manslaughter is a lesser 
included offense of second degree murder. Id. 
Subsection (3)(c) provides that an offense is included 
when "[i]t is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser 
included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(c) (1990). In 
Crick, the court ftconclude[d] that § 76-5-201 and the succeeding 
sections under the heading of 'criminal homicide' (through § 76-
5-207 amount to . . . a designation" that those crimes are lesser 
included offenses of homicide. Id. at 530. Section 76-5-201 
states: 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if 
he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or 
with criminal negligence unlawfully causes 
the death of another. 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the 
first and second degree, manslaughter, or 
negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
Citing this section, the supreme court said: 
In the succeeding sections [to § 76-5-201], 
the Code sets out the statutory definitions 
of the various types of criminal homicide, 
each (except for automobile homicide) in 
descending order of seriousness. This 
structure—notably the identification of the 
crime of criminal homicide and the 
specification of common elements in § 76-5-
201, and the relationships inherent in the 
succeeding sections—fulfills the §76-1-
402(3)(c) requirement of specific (statutory) 
designation of a lesser included offense. 
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Consequently, all of the various degrees of 
homicide have the relationship of greater and 
lesser included offenses. 
Id. at 530 (footnote omitted). Using subsection (3)(c) of the 
lesser included offenses statute, the court has resolved the 
question of lesser included offenses in the context of the 
criminal homicide statutes. All of the various degrees of 
homicide have greater and lesser relationships. In other words, 
by specific statutory designation, manslaughter is a lesser 
included offense of second degree murder. 
Because manslaughter is a lesser included offense, the 
prosecution is entitled to a jury instruction on the offense, 
even over defendant's objection2, if there is no risk that the 
defendant will be prejudiced by lack of notice and preparation. 
Howell, 649 P.2d at 95. Just as in Howell, defendant in the 
present case was not prejudiced by the State's requested 
instruction on attempted manslaughter. By his own requested 
instructions, defendant made it clear well before trial that he 
2
 It is questionable if defendant properly preserved his 
objection to the instruction at trial. Mid-trial, defendant 
objected to the requested lesser included offense instructions by 
saying: 
Our objection is that we feel the lesser 
included option should be with the defendant; 
that the state should choose what charge they 
intend to prosecute under. 
(R. 120 [Transcript of trial] at 116). This objection did not 
alert the trial court to defendant's appellate argument that 
manslaughter is not necessarily a lesser included offense of second 
degree murder. Therefore, this Court could decline to address the 
merits of this case based on defendant's failure to properly 
preserve this issue. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
1989) (grounds for objection must be distinctly and specifically 
stated in trial court to preserve issue on appeal). 
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was intending to rely on the justification of self-defense or of 
defense of habitation (R. at 32-33). A month before trial, the 
prosecution requested a lesser included instruction on attempted 
manslaughter which contained the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-205(1)(c) regarding legal justification or excuse (R. at 46). 
Defendant was on notice that the State was going to rebut his 
claim of justification for the shooting. Defendant was accorded 
due process because he had adequate notice of the charges against 
him through either the original charge or the State's pretrial 
request for a lesser included offense instruction. He also had 
sufficient time to prepare his defense of justification and to 
address the State's claim that defendant was not legally 
justified in shooting the victim. Howell, 649 P.2d at 95. 
Because defendant's due process right was preserved, the court 
correctly instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of 
attempted manslaughter. 
Since the lesser included offense instruction was 
proper, the State will not address defendant's claim that he 
cannot be retried. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / W^day of June, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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